public official, Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois. Senator Durbin is said to have asked Judge Roberts the following question: What would you do if the law required a ruling that the Catholic Church considers immoral? 4 Professor Turley described Judge Roberts's response in these words: "Renowned for his unflappable style in oral argument, Roberts appeared nonplused and, according to sources in the meeting, answered after a long pause that he would probably have to recuse himself." 5 Turley went on to characterize Roberts's response as "the wrong answer" to Durbin's question. The answer was wrong, Turley explained, because "[i]n taking office, a justice takes an oath to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the United States. A judge's personal religious views should have no role in the interpretation of the laws." 6 Turley gave Roberts credit for not saying that his faith would control his legal judgment in the sort of case Durbin proposed, but he did express the fear that, "if [Roberts] were to recuse himself on such issues as abortion and the death penalty, it would raise the specter of an evenly split Supreme Court on some of the nation's most important cases." 7 While Senator Durbin's office has disputed the accuracy of Turley's description of the conversation, 8 Turley's account of Durbin's question and Roberts's response fueled debate across 6 Id. The proper role that religious values should play in judicial decision making (i.e., the proper role that religious values should play in the process by which a judge comes to decide what the law actually means and demands in a given case) is a question beyond the scope of this Essay. Indeed, it is a question that is significantly different than the question that Durbin actually asked Roberts. Durbin's exchange with Roberts is really concerned with the following question: What should a morally conscientious judge do when the law as the judge interprets it is truly unjust and the action that the law requires of the judge in a given case is truly in conflict with the conscientious convictions of the judge? Many scholars have considered the distinct question of the role that religious values should play in judicial decision making. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND there are a large number of situations in which a Catholic judge's fidelity to his or her conscience will require the judge to refuse to fulfill his or her judicial duties in a particular case, and I think it is highly unlikely that such a situation will present itself in the context of Supreme Court adjudication.
The analysis that leads to this conclusion moves through three steps. Part I of the Essay will provide some of the context behind the controversy over John Roberts's Catholicism. In particular, it will focus attention on a critical distinction that is often overlooked in debates about the place of faith in public life; the distinction between the role of the legislator and the role of the judge. Part II will then discuss the framework of moral analysis that we should use to assess whether there is a conflict between the demands of a judge's conscience 1 1 and the demands In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience faithfully, in order that he may come to God, for whom he was created. It follows that he is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience. Nor, on the other hand is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience, especially in matters religious. 453 (1992) (explaining that conscience must be understood "not as a fancy or an opinion, but as a dutiful obedience to what claims to be a divine voice speaking within us"); id. at 450 ("Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations."). The duty to follow one's conscience is rooted in the duty to search for the truth and the obligation to form one's conscience well. See CCC, supra, 7 1783-85; DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra, 2 ("[Alll men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth .... They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth."); Gregory A. Kalscheur, S. Conscience for Newman does not mean that the subject is the standard vis-A-vis the claims of authority in a truthless world .... Much more than that, conscience signifies the perceptible and demanding presence of the voice of of the law that might force the judge to withdraw from a case. Moral theologians call this analytical framework the principle of cooperation with evil. Part III will then apply that principle in the context of three cases, two involving abortion and the other the death penalty, that arguably present a conflict between a judge's conscience and the law.
DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM DIGNITATIS HUMANAE T 3 (1965) [hereinafter
PART I
To begin, we need to focus a bit on the wider context that made the exchange between Senator Durbin and Judge Roberts such a lightening rod for controversy. The first relevant element of that context is the Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the Participation of Catholics in Political Life that was issued by the Vatican's Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith ("CDF") in November of 2002.12 The Doctrinal Note reminds Catholics involved in public life that "a well-formed Christian conscience does not permit one to vote for a political program or an individual law which contradicts the fundamental contents of faith and morals." 13 In particular, the Note states that "those who are directly involved in lawmaking bodies have a ograve and clear obligation to oppose>) any law that attacks human life. For them, as for every Catholic, it is impossible to promote such laws or to vote for them." 14 As the Note explains, "When political truth in the subject himself. It is the overcoming of mere subjectivity in the encounter of the inferiority of man with the truth from God. Id. at 25.
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL NOTE ON SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE (2002),
available at http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_ concfaithdoc_20021124 politica-en.html [hereinafter DOCTRINAL NOTE].
13 Id. 4. 14 Id.; see also JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE 73 (1995) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE] ("In the case of an intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to 'take part in a propaganda campaign in favor of such a law, or vote for it.' "). Evangelium Vitae 73 and the complexity of determining when a law in fact is an intrinsically unjust law permitting abortion). Finnis argues that a provision is "permissive" of abortion and intrinsically unjust "only if it has the legal meaning and effect of reducing the state's legal protection of the unborn." Id. at 209; see also id. at 232-33 (stating that consideration of the legal and legislative context and circumstances that give rise to a law, as well as a legislator's intent in voting for the law, are relevant to assessing whether the law's meaning and effect are "permissive" activity comes up against moral principles that do not admit of exception, compromise or derogation, the Catholic commitment becomes more evident and laden with responsibility." 15 Finally, the Note asserts that Catholic participation in political life raises "the lay Catholic's duty to be morally coherent." This duty is "found within one's conscience, which is one and iridivisible."16 None of us, including public officials, leads parallel moral lives that can be compartmentalized into separate spheres, one spiritual and one secular. Instead, "[1]iving and acting in conformity with one's own conscience on questions of politics is... the way in which Christians offer their concrete contributions so that, through political life, society will become more just and more consistent with the dignity of the human person." 17 These principles drawn from the CDF's Doctrinal Note laid the foundation for the communion controversy that was sparked by statements made by a small number of bishops during the year before the 2004 presidential election. That controversy forms a crucial element of the context behind the discussion of the relationship between Roberts's faith and his role as a Supreme Court Justice. The bishops whose statements led to the communion controversy asserted that Catholic politicians who espouse pro-choice political positions should be excluded from receiving communion. 1 8 As moral theologian Father Bryan Massingale explains, " [T] he actions taken by these bishops were interpreted as just a shade less serious than public excommunication." Moreover, the bishops "were widely viewed as implying that it would be immoral for a That does not involve imposing any religious views that I have or moral views that I have on the rest of the country.
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Senator Durbin was quick to praise this answer, noting that Alito's response acknowledged that Alito was describing "the same challenge many of us face on this side of the table with decisions that we face. '28 Senator Durbin's reaction to Judge Alito's answer is worth pausing over.
Catholic public officials like Senator Durbin, Senator Kerry, and Governor Cuomo have often responded to ecclesial criticism of their voting records by drawing a line between their personal religious and moral views and their public policy positions. They contend that, while as Catholics they may be personally opposed to abortion, they cannot impose their personal religious views on the rest of the country. The bishops' frustration with this sort of separation of personal conscience from political policy was clearly one of the factors driving the communion controversy that followed the promulgation of the CDF's Doctrinal Note. 2 Catholic politicians who not only ignore church teaching on abortion but actively espouse a contrary position has continued to grow."). Bryan Massingale describes two frustrations on the part of the bishops. First, the bishops are frustrated by what they see as inconsistency between the expressed personal opposition to abortion by many Catholic politicians and their failure to engage in public advocacy against abortion. The second source of frustration is the assumption of many Catholic politicians (and members of the wider public) that opposition to abortion amounts to the imposition of a sectarian moral code on a pluralistic society. The bishops maintain that the church's opposition to abortion is based on the natural moral law-"a common moral truth that spans religious affiliations"-that can be recognized and embraced "by all reasonable people of good will." For the bishops, it is difficult to understand why a politician would hesitate to act on a conviction that "is an obvious conclusion of common morality," rather than a sectarian position seemed to suggest that he detected the same sort of separation of personal conscience and public decision making in Judge Alito and Judge Roberts's explanations of the relationship between their personal faith and their public role as judges. In fact, Senator Durbin's comment on Judge Alito's answer implicitly suggests the following provocative question: If the bishops are so upset with Senator Kerry and Senator Durbin for separating their personal views as Catholics from their public policy positions, why doesn't consistency demand that the bishops criticize Catholic judges for separating their Catholic beliefs from their public decision making as judges?
In the context of the lingering anger over the communion controversy, this question of consistency really seems to have been the subtext underlying much of the debate about John Roberts's Catholicism in the summer of 2005. In order to answer Senator Durbin's implicit question, however, we must keep in mind a critical distinction that is too often overlooked in contemporary debates about the role of faith in public life, namely, the distinction between the role of the judge in our constitutional system and the very different role of a legislator or a policy maker. Senator Durbin is wrong to equate the moral challenges faced by legislators and judges in their decision making.
He is wrong because the different roles held by legislators and judges mean that legislators and judges are usually making very different sorts of decisions. 33 Collett, supra note 6, at 1299. Accordingly, when religious wisdom "conflicts with the political choices embodied in the positive law," judicial reliance on religious wisdom should be restricted. This sort of judicial respect for positive law-a respect grounded in a moral commitment to the good of democratic selfgovernment-is consistent with a proper understanding of the differentiated relationship that exists between law and morality. As Professor Robert George explains:
[T]he question of how much legislative authority a judge has to translate the natural law into positive law by nullifying positive law which he believes to be unjust is a question of positive law, not natural law. Different political systems reasonably differ (both in theory and practice) as to how much legislative authority they confer upon judges. Thus, the distinct roles played by judges and legislators within the American constitutional system call judges and legislators to make different sorts of decisions with respect to the law. The role of the legislator is to craft laws that will best protect that limited portion of the common good that is committed to the care of the state acting through law. 36 Let us assume that a legislator states sincerely that he or she is persuaded that abortion is a grave moral evil because it constitutes an attack on the inviolable dignity of human life. That conscientious conclusion is not simply a matter of personal morality with no public import; it is a moral conviction that should influence how that legislator thinks about public policy. Because abortion ends a human life, it is not simply a private matter. Instead, as an attack on the fundamental human right to life, abortion is contrary to justice and the common good. 37 If a legislator desires to live a life of integrity and moral coherence, his or her participation in politics should not be cut off from the conscientious judgment he or she has made about the morality of 35 Letter from Robert George, supra note 34 (discussing the "positivism" of Justice Scalia).
36 For a discussion of the proper limits on the use of the law to promote the common good, see Kalscheur, supra note 11, at 13-30; see also CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION DONUM VITAE pt. III (1987) [hereinafter DONUM VITAE] ("In no sphere of life can the civil law... dictate norms concerning things which are outside its competence.").
37 See Kalscheur, supra note 11, at 27. abortion. Since a legislator's role is to craft positive law that will best promote the common good, a legislator who holds the conscientious conviction that abortion is a grave moral evil has a corresponding duty to craft laws aimed towards reducing the incidence of abortion. How a policy maker should go about striving to reduce the incidence of abortion in contemporary American culture, under existing constitutional constraints and in the face of significant social disagreement with regard to the underlying moral issue, is an exceptionally complicated question. Good lawmaking is never simply a matter of directly transposing moral conclusions into rules of civil law. Drawing on jurisprudential principles rooted in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, the Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray explained that moral law and civil law are essentially related, but necessarily differentiated:
Both the science and art of jurisprudence and also the statesman's craft rest on the differential character of law and morals, of legal experience and religious or moral experience, of political unity and religious unity. Thus, the complex question of how best to promote fundamental moral values through civil law so as to most effectively promote the common good in the particular social context facing the legislator is always a contingent question that calls for the legislator to exercise the virtue of prudence.
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While the role of the legislator is to strive to embody in positive law those policies that will (in the conscientious, prudential judgment of the legislator) best promote the common good, the role of the judge with regard to the common good is significantly different. " [T] he choices involved in making law differ from those involved in deciding law." 40 The role of the [I] t is necessary for all Catholics, and for Catholic legislators, to agree with the Church's moral teaching on abortion. But I also find it not so clear when it comes to how best to translate that moral teaching into civil law in a society where only one-fourth of the population is Catholic, and when Catholics themselves are not all of one mind on how to deal with Roe v. Wade ....
[T]he bishops should be more helpful to legislators by acknowledging the complexities of the decisions they need to make on legislative matters related to moral issues. ; id. at 121 ("We must ... be loathe to judge our confreres who differ from us on prudential matters in the battle against abortion and euthanasia); Kalscheur, supra note 38, at 255-57; Fr. John Langan, S.J., Homily for Fr. Robert Drinan's Funeral, 36 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 556, 557 (2007) ("The shape of legislation can be a matter for prudential disagreement, not an issue of faithfulness."); Lemmons, supra note 38, at 29-33 (discussing the principles of juridical prudence that inform conscientious legislating); Massingale, supra note 19, at 470 ("Prudence ... seeks not the absolute best, but the best that can be attained for now."). As Archbishop John Quinn explains, It is fitting to bring into our Catholic consciousness the tradition of prudence in the church's teaching, with its probing question, What will make the situation better rather than worse for the protection of life in the full array of its claims? Losing sight of the full spectrum of issues which affect human dignity runs the grave risk of playing into the hands of those who are so eager to allege that the pro-life stance is a sectarian issue.
Archbishop John Quinn, The Virtue of Prudence and the Spectrum of Issues Affecting Human Dignity, 34 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 334, 335 (2004).
For a helpful discussion of the nuanced, contextual operation of the virtue of prudence, see Vischer, supra note 30, at 50-52. 40 Lemmons, supra note 38, at 30 (stating that because the choices involved are different, 'legislative and judicial cases must be distinguished and treated judge in our constitutional system is not primarily or directly to make public policy. Instead, the primary role of the judge is to use the tools of legal analysis to interpret the Constitution and laws, and to apply those laws as they exist in the context of deciding individual cases.
It is true that legal interpretation and judicial decision making often properly involves more than the mechanical deduction of conclusions from determinate legal norms. Legal norms can be indeterminate in a way that demands judicial specification in concrete cases. 41 Yet, there is still a critical difference between the role of legislators and that of judges. In exercising their role, legislators have the freedom to make whatever policy choices are not prohibited by the constitution that empowers them to act. Judges, in contrast, do not have unbounded policy-making power. 42 The legislator promotes the separately"). 41 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, COURTS 92-93 (2007) (specifying an indeterminate legal norm "is not a process of deduction or simple application of a general rule to a specific case; instead it is an exercise of good judgment"); see Kalscheur, supra note 34, at 135 (discussing Perry's approach to constitutional interpretation); see also PERRY, supra, at 93 (quoting Richard A. Posner, What am I? A Potted Plant?, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23, 24) (stating that to the extent that such a power to exercise good judgment involves "'a creative decision .... a kind of legislative judgment, [it] arguably belongs in the hands of the politically dependent, because electorally accountable, policymaking officials of the legislative and/or executive branches of government."); id. at 107 (endorsing a "system of judicial penultimacy" with respect to constitutionally entrenched indeterminate human rights norms as offering "the best of two worlds: an opportunity for a deliberative judicial consideration of a difficult and perhaps divisive human rights issue and an opportunity for electorally accountable officials to respond in a politically effective way").
42 See, e.g., Richard B. Saphire, Religion and Recusal, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 351, 351 (1998). "Judges, of course, wield political power.... But judges exercise a special kind of power. Generally speaking, the judicial function is not one of lawmaking, but of law application. It is the judge's task to determine what the law is and to apply it in the cases before him or her." Id. Legislators (and constitution makers) create the texts that articulate the norms which provide the "textual anchor" and discretionlimiting "tether" for legitimate judicial decision making:
Without a textual anchor for their decisions, judges would have to rely on some theory of natural right, or some allegedly shared standard of the ends and the limits of government, to strike down invasive legislation. But an appeal to normative ideals that lack any mooring in the written law ... would in societies like ours be suspect, because it would represent so profound an aberration from majoritarian principles.... A text, moreover, is necessary not only to make judges' decisions efficacious: it also helps to tether their discretion. I would be the last to cabin judges' power to keep the law vital, to ensure that it remains abreast of the progress in man's intellect and sensibilities. Unbounded freedom, however, is another common good by striving to enact just legal norms. The judge promotes the common good by interpreting, applying, and specifying legislatively enacted or constitutionally entrenched legal norms in a way that upholds the fundamental component of the common good that is known as the rule of law. 43 While the judge's convictions regarding morality and justice will properly play a role in the development of the law, 44 the role of the judge in our constitutional system places constraints on the judge's freedom simply to reshape the law to conform to his or her moral convictions about what the law ought to be in order to promote justice and the common good. The search must be for a [judicial] function.., which differs from the legislative and executive functions; ... which can be so exercised as to be acceptable in a society that generally shares Judge [Learned] Hand's satisfaction in a 'sense of common venture'; which will be effective when needed; and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the other departments' performance by denuding them of the dignity and burden of their own responsibility. Id. at 139 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 24 (1962)). 43 Cf. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-73 (1980) (discussing the relationship between the rule of law and the requirements of justice and the common good). 44 See Vischer, supra note 30, at 63 ("[T]he law's indeterminacy may allow a judge's rightly formed conception of justice to have a positive impact on the law's development. The judge's sense of right and wrong,' after all, 'shapes, to some extent, the direction in which the law evolves.'" (quoting Dulles, supra note 9, at 288)). 45 See Dulles, supra note 9, at 287-88; see also Vischer, supra note 30, at 61. Vischer states that:
[F]or a judge, extralegal moral norms should be kept at the margins when evaluating the performance of her professional role .... [Bly looking beyond her own moral convictions (which is a starkly different proposition than pretending her own moral convictions do not exist), she can acknowledge the moral significance of judging without subverting the rule of law. 48 Cardinal Levada, formerly archbishop of San Francisco, and now the head of the Vatican Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith, has asserted that the "Supreme Court's judgment about the application of the Constitution should ... be guided by the principles of the moral law." Levada, supra note 29, at 104. It is not clear what Cardinal Levada means here, but we need not conclude that he is arguing that the Supreme Court has the power to make decisions that comply with the principles of the moral law even when there is no basis in proper constitutional analysis for so concluding. Cardinal Levada notes, for example, that Catholic moral teaching recognizes "that those who make and interpret the law are not always able to deal with ideal or perfect solutions." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Cardinal would seem to acknowledge that proper interpretation of the Constitution may sometimes preclude a decision that reflects the "ideal or perfect" embodiment of the moral law. As Professor Douglas W. Kmiec, explains, "There is no 'Catholic way' of interpreting the U.S. Constitution. The tools of constitutional interpretation are its text, history, and structure." While Catholics with familiarity with the natural law tradition "will more readily grasp that our constitutional history includes the selfevident truths of creation, equality, and unalienable rights referenced in the Declaration of Independence," these are not exclusively Catholic truths. Douglas 49 See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 14, 66 ("To concur with the intention of another person to commit suicide and to help in carrying it out through so-called 'assisted suicide' means to cooperate in, and at times to be the actual perpetrator of, an injustice which can never be excused even if it is requested.").
nothing in the Constitution prohibited the state from enacting such a statute.
What should a morally conscientious judge do, however, when the law, as it exists, is truly unjust and the action that the law requires of the judge in a given case is truly in conflict with the conscientious convictions of the judge? This question brings us back to the exchange between Senator Durbin and John Roberts: What would you do, the Catholic senator asked the Catholic judge, if the law required you to issue a ruling that the Catholic Church considered immoral? Roberts replied that, in such a conflict between his Catholic moral beliefs and the ruling required by the law, he would probably have to recuse himself. In this sort of situation, the conscientious judge might indeed have to remove himself in order to avoid cooperating in a morally evil action. In other words, the judge will have to decide whether the action required of him by the law in a particular case culpably contributes to the morally objectionable act of another person.
This, then, becomes the crucial question: Does the desire to avoid cooperation in moral evil make the conscientious Catholic unfit for judicial service in a constitutional system that will inevitably bring before the Catholic judge cases that implicate a host of issues as to which the Church offers moral teaching? I think the answer to that question is no; there is no good reason why a conscientious Catholic should not be able to serve as a judge, and a judge's Catholicism should not raise any special suspicions about his or her ability to faithfully carry out the judicial role in the vast majority of cases that will come before the judge. In order to understand why this is so, we need to take a very short course in a fairly complicated corner of moral theology.
PART II In everyday life, all of us in various ways find ourselves cooperating in the morally objectionable actions of other people. A person might, for example, live in a state that provides public funding for embryonic stem cell research. Assume that the person accepts the Church's teaching that the destruction of embryonic human life is a moral evil. Taxes collected from that person will help facilitate the destruction of human embryos. Because the tax money facilitates the research, the person is cooperating in what he has concluded is a morally evil act. At the same time, however, it does not seem reasonable to conclude that the taxpayer himself is committing a morally evil act simply by paying his taxes as the law requires. 50 In order to help people navigate these sorts of situations without themselves committing wrongful actions, moral theologians have developed an analytical framework that is called the principle of cooperation.
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Before going any further down this road, I want to offer a disclaimer: The principle of cooperation is not a bright-line rule that provides us with many easy answers. In fact, an English Jesuit theologian once wrote in a textbook that, of all the principles in moral theology, the principle of cooperation is the most difficult to apply. 5 62 An actor has a proportionate reason to engage in material cooperation when the actor reaches the conclusion that the reasons for acting are "sufficiently strong that doing the act would be reasonable despite the more or less strong reasons to forgo" the act of cooperation. 63 Reaching this judgment about the comparative strength of the arguments for and against engaging in the act of cooperation is the "work of prudence," 64 and the permissibility of material cooperation has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Moral theologians have developed elaborate sets of categories that attempt to capture the various factors that help to determine whether a person has a proportionate reason to engage in an act of material cooperation.
65
For example, the tradition makes an important distinction between remote material cooperation and proximate material cooperation. As an act of material cooperation gets closer to the wrongful act in time, space, or causal connection, the harder it is to justify. 66 66 See, e.g., HARING, supra note 53, at 499 ("These reasons [which justify material cooperation] must be the more valid and weighty ... the more proximate our contribution or cooperation in the sinful action of others .... ). Grisez rejects this distinction. He argues that the closeness of a material cooperator's involvement in the wrongdoing of another is not morally significant of itself. The closeness of involvement does, however, "correlate... more or less well with many of the factors affecting the strength of reasons not to cooperate." Highly proximate cooperation may, for example, make it more difficult for the cooperator to witness to the truth and may create a higher risk of scandal to others. "Still closeness of involvement is morally insignificant unless correlated with some factor that affects the strength of act exists may in turn depend on additional factors. For example, how grave a loss would be suffered by the cooperator if she declines to engage in the act of cooperation? What is the magnitude of the evil that will result from the wrongful act intended by the other person? How certain is it that the act of cooperation really will be misused by the other person? How probable is it that refusal to engage in the act of cooperation would prevent the wrongdoing by the other person? And, finally, how much risk is there that the act of cooperation will cause scandal to others? 67 Professor Kaveny notes that "causing scandal" in this context has to be understood in its specialized theological sense: Does performing a particular action increase the possibility that people who witness the action will engage in morally objectionable activity themselves?
Will the act of cooperation have the effect of leading other people into sin? 68 This framework for analysis was refined over time through the process of comparing and contrasting particular cases, which is known as casuistry. Among the classic cases discussed by the casuists was a situation particularly relevant to the role of the judge: Can a Catholic judge preside over a divorce case? The traditional answer is yes; for grave and proportionate reasons, such judges may act in accordance with the traditional principles of material cooperation. 69 The casuists argued that it generally promotes the common good for a conscientious judge to be part of the legal system, because of the justice that we hope the work of the reason not to cooperate." 3 GRISEZ, supra note 50, at 890. 67 See HARtING, supra note 53, at 499 (describing the reasons that justify material cooperation and "which may even suggest and advise it, if they do not go so far as to oblige it"). PUBLIC LIFE 31 (Newman Press 1958) (1946) (noting that a "sufficiently weighty" reason for a judge to preside over a divorce case "would seem to be present if the judge were in danger of losing his office in the event that he refused to accept a divorce suit, or even if serious antagonism and loss of prestige ensued"); HARING, supra note 53, at 511 ("Should [the judge] in no way be able to prevent the action [i.e., granting a divorce to a couple whose marriage is valid before God], despite all his sincere efforts, we may look upon his granting of the divorce as material cooperation which is permitted for a grave reason; for loss of office would indeed be a grave consideration."); Hartnett, supra note 51, at 246-48 (discussing judicial cooperation in the context of divorce). the judge can bring to the institution of the law as a whole. 70 The judge, therefore, has a proportionate reason for being faithful to the demands of the law in this case.
This analytical framework also applies to the individual Catholic in his or her role as voter. As noted above, prior to the 2004 election, the bishop of Colorado Springs, Michael Sheridan, suggested that any Catholic who votes in favor of a pro-choice candidate, illicit embryonic stem cell research, or euthanasia, "may not receive holy communion until they have recanted their positions and been reconciled with God and the church in the sacrament of penance." 71 Shortly thereafter, the current pope, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, in his role as head of the Vatican Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith, sent a memorandum regarding worthiness to receive communion to Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, then-archbishop of Washington, who was chair of the U.S. bishops' task force on Catholic politicians. Cardinal Ratzinger's memorandum concluded with a discussion of the principle of cooperation as it applies to a voter:
A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so unworthy to present himself for holy communion, if he were to deliberately vote for a candidate precisely because of the candidate's permissive stand on abortion and/or euthanasia. When a Catholic does not share a candidate's stand in favor of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons.72 Cardinal Ratzinger, however, did not explain how the voter was to assess whether or not proportionate reasons existed that would justify a vote for a candidate who takes a permissive stand on abortion or euthanasia. The remarks of Father DiNoia and Archbishop Levada suggest that "issues which require a person to employ proportionate reasoning on the issue of voting are matters of prudence on which people of good will might well differ." 78 Indeed, the bishops of Virginia stated that voters should approach the question of "proportionate reasons" in this way:
Assessing proportionality is a matter for the individual conscience. However, a conscience must be correctly formed before it can be properly followed. In other words, we must seek the "mind of Christ" in the voting judgments we make, just as we must do when contemplating any other moral decisions in 73 Heft, supra note 1, at 271. 74 Id. (emphasis added). 75 Id. at 264. 76 Id. at 264-65; cf. id. at 271 ("Even if they are right about the moral gravity of [abortion and embryonic stem-cell research], and I believe that they are, it does not necessarily follow that voting for a pro-life candidate, for such reasons, makes the most sense."). 77 Id. at 265. "Several bishops, including Bishop John Kinney of St. Cloud, Minnesota, warned against denying a pro-choice candidate communion, and added that 'no human is capable of judging someone else's relationship with God.'" Id. 78 Id. at 271. our lives. We urge each of you to inform your own consciences thoroughly, weighing all issues from the perspective of church teaching and of their implications for our brothers and sisters in the human family. In doing so, it is important to recognize just how serious abortion is when considering whether there are proportionate (i.e., very serious) reasons for making other important issues the decisive factor in our voting choices.
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The gravity of the moral evil of abortion clearly is a crucial consideration in assessing whether it is morally appropriate to vote for a particular candidate. Yet a voter should also consider seriously the degree to which a particular candidate is likely to be able to diminish the actual incidence of abortion, especially in light of the current constitutional status of the right to make the abortion decision. Moreover, grave as the issue of abortion unarguably is, it is not the only very serious moral issue that demands the attention of the conscientious voter.
The "promotion of the common good in all its forms" is a value that is "not negotiable" 8 0 as Catholics engage in the careful discernment [N]or is it prudent for bishops to tell the Catholic people which among several candidates they should vote for .... The voting booth, like the confessional, admits only one person at a time. There each of us stands before our conscience. But not alone. We hope that the charioteer of virtues, prudence, stands with us.
Id.
80 SACRAMENTUM CARITATIS, supra note 2, 83. The Holy Father identified the following fundamental values as "not negotiable" in making public policy decisions: "respect for human life, its defense from conception to natural death, the family built upon marriage between a man and a woman, the freedom to educate one's children, and the promotion of the common good in all its forms." Id. Political decision making should be "inspired by values grounded in human nature," and political decisions should be based on "a properly formed conscience." Id. While these fundamental moral values are "not negotiable," translating moral values into positive law in a pluralistic society is a complex endeavor. Indeed, deciding how best to promote fundamental moral values through civil legislation that will truly function as good law promoting the common good in all its forms under the concrete conditions of a given society demands the exercise of political prudence. The necessary process of conscience formation is appropriately attentive to the limits of what it might be possible for the law to accomplish under existing social, political, and constitutional conditions. See Lemmons, supra note 38, at 30-31; see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. As John Paul II explained in Evangelium Vitae, [W] hen it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting that is required to make conscientious decisions regarding their participation in public life.
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PART III
Now we are in a position to apply the principle of cooperation to the issues of abortion and the death penalty that might confront Catholic judges working in the contemporary American legal system. What sorts of issues might create a conflict between the judge's oath to faithfully and impartially apply the Constitution and laws of the United States 8 2 and that same judge's moral obligation to be faithful to the demands of his or her religiously informed conscience?
This question will be considered in the context of the following three cases:
( the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.
EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 14, 73; see also Finnis, supra note 14, at 209, 233 (discussing the meaning of Evangelium Vitae 73).
81 See Heft, supra note 1, at 273 (stating that the "global common good is precisely what all thoughtful Catholics and especially US Catholics have an obligation to promote"); see also id. at 273 n.36 (drawing a distinction between "a collective deed, such as the war in Iraq, which is an action of the US government and therefore directly and collectively implicates all US citizens" and "abortion which the government permits but does not perform").
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000). Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: 'I, _ , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as _ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God. Id.; see also Merz, supra note 28, at 309-10 ("A judge is bound by his or her oath of office to enforce the law in every case.... The duty of a judge to follow the law is... a moral obligation, for the oath of office imposes a strong moral duty."); cf. 3 GRISEZ, supra note 50, at 882 ("[If something must be done to fulfill a responsibility flowing from a vocational commitment, there is a stronger reason to accept bad side effects in doing it than if one could forgo the activity without slighting any such responsibility.").
83 410 U.S. 113 (1973 The constitutional law with respect to abortion after Casey has three central components: (1) Prior to viability, women have a constitutionally protected liberty interest to make the decision to 84 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 85 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.... I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.
Id.
have an abortion.
(2) Pre-viability regulation of abortion is unconstitutional if it places an undue burden on the woman's right to choose to have an abortion. (3) After viability, the state is free to prohibit abortion, except where appropriate medical judgment deems the abortion to be necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. 88 Four members of the Court--Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist-were prepared in Casey to overrule Roe. Two other members of the Court, Justices Blackmun and Stevens, wanted to retain the broad protection for the freedom to make the abortion decision that was drawn from Roe. The outcome of the case was, therefore, determined by the remaining three justices-O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souterwhose joint opinion now provides the controlling constitutional doctrine on abortion.
The joint opinion makes two points that are relevant to the topic of this Essay. It first develops an argument that attempts to explain how constitutional protection for the woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is supported by a line of precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 9 This leads the authors of the joint opinion to conclude that, no matter what any of them might personally believe about the morality of abortion, the Constitution of the United States places limits on the government's ability to regulate abortion. 90 The joint opinion then makes this interesting statement: Even though Pennsylvania made weighty arguments that Roe should be overruled, "the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of stare decisis." 9 1 In plain English, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy are saying that, even if we think Roe was wrongly decided, it is a precedent that people have come to rely on in planning their lives, 92 90 Id. at 850 ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.").
91
Id. at 853.
92
See id. at 855-56. now we will do damage to both the rule of law and to the legitimacy of the Court as an institution. 93 There are good grounds to conclude that the arguments made by the joint opinion should be rejected as a matter of sound constitutional analysis. 94 At the same time, however, it is wrong to conclude that a judge whose informed conscience tells him that abortion is a moral evil culpably cooperates in evil by taking the sort of position articulated in the joint opinion. A judge could reasonably join the joint opinion because he sincerely (even if erroneously) concludes that the Constitution, when properly interpreted, does provide protection for the right to make the abortion decision. Alternatively, a judge could join the joint opinion because he sincerely (even if erroneously) concludes that respect for the rule of law prevents him from voting to overrule the precedent established in Roe.
To conclude as a matter of constitutional law that a woman's right to make the abortion decision must be protected does facilitate abortion by creating the conditions that allow abortions to take place. If Roe were overruled, states would be free to prohibit more abortions, and some states would choose to do so. The judicial act of voting to maintain the central holding of Roe does, therefore, raise the issue of cooperation with evil. But the judge reaching such a conclusion for the reasons just described does not necessarily share in the intent of a woman who chooses to have an abortion. Accordingly, voting to uphold Roe does not constitute illicit formal cooperation. 95 Moreover, voting to uphold Roe does not require anyone to engage in any immoral act; it does no more than say that the law cannot prohibit a particular sort of immoral act. As Justice Scalia has said, "[A] judge ... bears no moral guilt for the laws society has failed to enact. '' 96 Deciding not to overrule Roe might, then, accurately be characterized as a 93 See id. at 869. 94 See, for example, id. at 951-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part), and id. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part), for criticisms of the joint opinion's due process and stare decisis analysis offered by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
95 See Hartnett, supra note 51, at 249 ("[Finding a law [prohibiting abortion] unconstitutional does not necessarily constitute formal cooperation in the evil that the law sought to avoid. More generally, a judicial decision that determines the legal allocation of power is not necessarily formal cooperation in the sins of those to whom the law allocates power.").
96 Scalia, supra note 34.
form of nonculpable, remote, material cooperation, which can be justified by the judge's duty to be faithful to his oath to uphold the law as he understands it.
97
Professor Douglas Kmiec explains that the Church does not instruct judges to make the law better if doing so would require them to act outside the proper bounds of their role as a judge. Thus, Catholic justices do not have a specific Catholic duty to use their power on the bench to restrain abortion. 98 
"). Professor
Ledewitz argues that a pro-life judge should resign rather than enforcing the law in a way that provides direct or indirect aid to abortion. "The very fact that abortion is legal offers tremendous legitimation to abortion .... Thus, it may not be possible to remain a judge at all in a society that allows, and encourages, abortion." Id. at 16. As Professor Hartnett notes, however, the Catholic judge's refusal to participate in any abortion cases is unlikely to prevent the underlying wrong of abortion. "[D]ifferent judges will be brought in to decide the cases in accordance with the law.... Worse, if Catholic judges refuse to hear abortion cases because of the risk of material cooperation, their legal perspective on such issues will be lost to the courts." Hartnett, supra note 51, at 256; see also Lois G. Forer, The Role of Conscience in Judicial Decision-Making, in THE WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW & RELIGION 285, 301 n.35 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 1988) ("I have refused to sit on cases in which the death penalty has been demanded. The result has been the preservation of my own moral integrity at the price of submitting defendants to a court composed of 'death qualified' judges.").
98 Kmiec, supra note 48. But cf. Paulsen, supra note 33, at 37.
[J]udges should never apply Roe or other pro-abortion law against conscience. The moral imperative is to resist Roe through every legitimate means.... Where it is not possible for the judge honestly to avoid the rule of Roe, the judge should refuse to enforce Roe in any event, not through the subversion of the rule of law, but by challenging the Supreme Court's clearly erroneous holding, by recusing himself in the particular case, or, if push comes to shove, by resigning.
Id.
99 The same sort of cooperation analysis applies to the decisions of lower court judges who, prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gonzalez v. Carhart, 1 0 0 concluded that controlling precedent required them to declare unconstitutional the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.101 A judge whose ruling strikes down a law that would restrict some abortions because that judge reaches the legal conclusion that the law is unconstitutional is not morally complicit in the abortions that would have been prohibited by the unconstitutional law.102 Judge Richard Conway Casey of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York faced this situation in the case of National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft.
103
The plaintiffs in that case challenged the Federal PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act, which bans the procedure the Act defines as partial-birth abortion, unless the procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother. 1 0 4 Congress passed this A judge may frequently be confronted by the predicament of pronouncing 'justice' or 'right' according to an unjust law. If by some legal provision he is permitted to withdraw from the case or is in some way able to avoid making the decision, he cannot be excused from the guilt of formal cooperation if he, nevertheless, decides the case. Should this withdrawal be impossible, then we must hold that his act goes no further than his pronunciation that the law applies in this particular instance, a decision which can be viewed as only material cooperation. HARING, supra note 53, at 510. The judge's intent in pronouncing and applying the law, however, does not vary according to whether or not withdrawal is an option for the judge. If the nature of the judge's intent is the key to making the distinction between formal cooperation and material cooperation, the possibility of recusal in a given case shouldn't convert a good intent into an intent that coincides with that of the wrongdoer. It seems that Professor Kmiec has better captured the key distinction. If the judge in issuing his decision intends that the underlying moral wrong be done, he is guilty of formal cooperation. If he intends only to say what the law is, and the law allows a moral wrong to occur, the judicial act is better characterized as material cooperation, which might be justified by proportionate reasons. The Stenberg Court held that the Nebraska law was unconstitutional, in part because it did not provide an exception allowing the procedure when it was necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, to preserve the health of the mother. As a lower court judge, Judge Casey was bound to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg as the relevant precedent governing his analysis of the constitutionality of the new federal statute.
Judge Casey ultimately concluded that there was no way to read Stenberg that would allow him to conclude that the federal statute was constitutional.
He closed his opinion enjoining enforcement of the statute with these words:
While... lower courts may disagree with the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions, that does not free them from their constitutional duty to obey the Supreme Court's rulings .... The Supreme Court in Stenberg informed us that this gruesome procedure may be outlawed only if there exists a medical consensus that there is no circumstance in which any woman could potentially benefit from it. A division of medical opinion exists, [and] [s]uch a division means that the Constitution requires a health exception. Stenberg obligates this Court ... to defer to the expressed medical opinion of a significant body of medical authority.... Stenberg remains the law of the land. Therefore, the Act is unconstitutional. Such a ruling did not make Judge Casey morally culpable for the law's inability to prohibit a practice which his opinion Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly performs a parital-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. This subsection does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a); see also id. § 1531(b)(1) (defining the term "partial-birth abortion"). "The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman's health, given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives." Id.
describes in excruciating detail, and which his factual findings explicitly characterize as "a gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized medical procedure. 10 7 Judge Casey's action is best characterized as remote, material cooperation that is justified by the proportionate reason of the judge's duty to be faithful to his oath to uphold the law, which here includes an obligation to obey what the judge understood to be a controlling Supreme Court precedent. 0 8 As Professor Hartnett explains, "[I]t would appear that in most abortion cases, a judge's material cooperation is permissible, particularly if a judge takes steps to avoid scandal by letting others know that his or her legal decision does not imply approval of direct abortion." 1 0 9
Case #2 While a judge's participation in most cases involving the issue of abortion can be understood as permissible material cooperation, the case of a judge called upon to preside over a judicial bypass proceeding where a minor is seeking authorization for an abortion without her parents' involvement is 107 Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 479; see also Hartnett, supra note 51, at 268 (noting that Judge Casey's opinion helped to reduce the risk of scandal "by letting others know that cooperation does not imply approval"). 108 For an argument that neither the demands of a hierarchical judicial system nor fidelity to the rule of law requires a lower court judge to enforce a "controlling" precedent that the judge concludes is lawless and immoral, see Paulsen, supra note 33, at 82-88, which urges lower court judges to "underrule" Roe by refusing to be bound by a lawless precedent. "So long as the lower court may still be reversed by the higher court, there is no interference with either the 'supremacy' of the Supreme Court or with the idea of the rule of law." Id. at 84; see also id. at 85 (" [W] hile it might be thought a breach of decorum for an inferior court to repudiate a precedent of a superior tribunal, such conduct is not constitutionally insubordinate, and is surely not categorically improper."). Professor Paulsen explains that "[tihe conscientious lower court judge must not become an accomplice in ... [the] dirty work" of enforcing an ultra vires interpretation of the Constitution like Roe:
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that a judge following this course will be reversed (and chastised) by a reviewing court, and directed to enter an order based on the unjust and unjustifiable precedent.... But when the source of the judge's ... dilemma is lawless judicial precedent rather than validly adopted positive law, the judge need not in the first instance follow the quasi-traditional path of criticism, recusal, and resignation, but should first undertake to underrule the lawless precedent. Id. at 88. But cf. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) ("[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be."). 109 Hartnett, supra note 51, at 257.
different. More than forty states have statutes requiring that parents be involved in their minor daughter's decision to seek an abortion. 110 Some states require parental consent while others require parental notification.' 1 1 In order for a parental consent statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the statute must allow a minor who does not wish to involve her parents in the decision to petition a judge to authorize the abortion without parental consent. 1 1 2 The Wisconsin parental consent statute, for example, provides that, except in cases involving a medical emergency or other specified extenuating circumstances, a physician may not perform an abortion for a minor unless (1) the physician has received the informed written consent of one of the minor's parents or (2) a court has granted a petition waiving the parental consent requirement. 1 1 3 The statute further provides that the court "shall grant the petition" if the court, after a confidential hearing, finds either "[tjhat the minor is mature and well-informed enough to make the abortion decision on her own,"
or "that the performance ... of the abortion is in the minor's best interest."114
A judge who believes that abortion is a moral evil and is called upon to preside over one of these parental involvement bypass hearings may indeed face a conflict between conscience and an act that he is required by the law to perform. Unlike the judges called upon to interpret the Constitution in Case #1, the judge in Case #2 may be required by the law to issue an order authorizing a particular minor to obtain an abortion without If the judge issued an order authorizing the minor to obtain an abortion without the involvement of her parents on the ground that the abortion was in the best interest of the minor, the judge's act is almost certainly best characterized as illicit formal cooperation. " [A] determination that an abortion is in someone's best interests constitutes a decision that an abortion should take place." 116 Thus, when issuing such an order, the judge presumably intends that the minor should proceed to obtain the abortion. To issue an order with this intent constitutes formal cooperation in the ensuing wrongful act of abortion.
117
In contrast, a judge who issues an order authorizing an abortion without the involvement of the minor's parents on the ground that the minor is mature enough to make the decision on her own, may be involved in material, rather than formal, cooperation in the abortion obtained by the minor. The judge might intend only to apply the law faithfully; he or she does not necessarily issue the order with the intent that the minor obtain the abortion. Is the material cooperation involved in issuing such an order permissible? 115 The principle of cooperation also structures the analytical framework that applies to the question of whether or not an attorney who believes that abortion is a grave moral evil can licitly represent a minor in a parental involvement bypass hearing. 117 See id. at 250-51.
The material cooperation here is best characterized as proximate, not remote; the judge's action here is much closer to an actual act of wrongdoing than is true in Case #1. At the same time, it is still possible to separate the judge's act of applying the law from the minor's independent act of deciding whether to have the abortion or not. If she decides to have the abortion, she would be misusing the freedom that the judge's obligation to comply with the law gives her. Still, in light of the temporal proximity that the order authorizing the abortion would have to the actual act of wrongdoing, the gravity of the wrongdoing that is being explicitly authorized by the judge, and the critical role played by the judge in making it possible for the minor to obtain the abortion, 11 it may be difficult to conclude that the judge's act of material cooperation can be justified by a proportionate reason. Under this analysis, judges who hold the conscientious conviction that abortion is a grave moral evil have strong reasons to recuse themselves from judicial bypass proceedings in order to avoid culpable material cooperation in evil. 119 Judges have in fact begun to opt out of these abortion petition cases on moral grounds. In September of 2005, the New York Times reported that a Tennessee judge refused to hear a minor's abortion petition case. 120 The judge also announced that he would recuse himself from all such cases in the future. Judge John R. McCarroll of the Shelby County Circuit Court explained that he recused himself because he believed that "[t]aking the life of an innocent human being is contrary to the moral order," and he, therefore, "could not in good conscience make a finding that lawyer who represents a particular minor in a judicial bypass proceeding would be a necessary cooperator to a specific abortion. He is directly involved in the death of a particular fetus."). Cunningham suggests that it might be possible to argue that the lawyer's assistance was not "necessary" to the abortion:
What is it that he is 'assisting?' It is not the physical act of the death of the fetus, but instead the minor's decision or ability to have the physical act performed. His assistance is a step or two removed from the act, and is legal, not physical, in nature.... A lawyer's assistance is not with the actual, physical procedure; it is with providing the opportunity for the physical act to occur. would allow the minor to proceed with the abortion." 12 1 In effect, Judge McCarroll was saying that his conscience made it impossible for him to follow the law that applied to the case. Four of the other nine judges on the Shelby County Court have made similar recusal decisions, and the Times report noted that judges in Alabama and Pennsylvania have also said they will not hear such cases.
122
In response to Judge McCarroll's announcement, twelve experts on judicial ethics wrote to the Tennessee Supreme Court describing his action as "lawless." 123 The letter explained that " [u] nwillingness to follow the law is not a legitimate ground for recusal." 124 The law professors' letter asserted that Judge McCarroll's only options were to enforce the law or resign from the bench. One of the professors, Susan Koniak, said that judges are free to express their moral disagreement with a law but are not free to decline to enforce a law with which they disagree.
125
And one of Judge McCarroll's colleagues in Shelby County had this to say, "I didn't swear to uphold all of the laws of Tennessee except for X, Y, and Z. You're sworn to uphold the law whether you agree with it or not." 126 As Professor Bruce Ledewitz notes, judges are expected to "take any case to which they happen to be 121 Id. If a judge could not enforce the law, then, as people have often had to do when they face matters of conscience, the judge should pay the price of his or her conscience. The price of a judge's conscience would be to step down from the bench.... I disagree with the proposition that a judge should have a blanket recusal in cases of this sort. Id. But see Hartnett, supra note 51, at 260-64 (arguing that resignation is "unnecessary overkill" unless the frequency of recusals results in an unfair burden on the judges to whom the cases are ultimately assigned; in this respect recusals on moral grounds are no different from recusals on other grounds). 129 Liptak, supra note 120; see Pryor, supra note 45, at 361 (arguing that recusal allows the judge both to honor the law "by refusing to disobey it" and honor his conscience "by avoiding cooperation with evil. . . . The judge cannot be impartial to his moral duty, and [the canons of judicial ethics] requireU a judge to 'disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' The law acknowledges that judges, in rare cases, should step aside.").
130 See Hartnett, supra note 51, at 259-60; Osborn, supra note 10, at 903 ("A judge who determines himself to be partial can disqualify himself under the Judicial Model Code."); Treadwell, supra note 110, at 875 ("If the judge's moral beliefs about abortion are so embedded in his conscience that he cannot bring himself to neutrally apply the law, he should recuse himself from the case.").
Based 
Case #3
Does a judge who wants to be faithful to the Church's teaching on the death penalty culpably cooperate with evil by participating in the judicial proceedings associated with capital punishment? As the abortion cases just discussed suggest, this is a complex question because of the variety of roles that judges can play in the legal proceedings surrounding capital punishment. Therefore, any cooperation analysis will depend on just what sort of role the judge is playing.
The Church does not teach that the death penalty is an intrinsic evil.
This makes imposition of the death penalty different from the intentional taking of innocent life involved in abortion.
The current Catechism of the Catholic Church, however, does insist that the death penalty can only be used when it is "the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against an unjust aggressor." 131 When non-lethal means are available to protect people's safety, the State should limit itself to using those non-lethal means, because they are more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in conformity with the dignity of the human person.
Under contemporary conditions in a developed country like the United States, society can be adequately protected by keeping criminals securely incarcerated. 132 In light of this teaching, it is difficult to imagine when the imposition of the death penalty could be characterized as a just punishment in the United States.
Thirty-eight states and the federal government, however, do authorize the use of the death penalty in some cases. judge who accepts the Church's teaching on the death penalty participate in judicial proceedings that will culminate in the imposition of an unjust penalty? Can a Catholic judge cooperate with the "machinery of death"? Justice Scalia, who rejects the Church's teaching on the death penalty, 134 argues that Catholic judges who share the Church's understanding of the death penalty should resign their office if they are unable to uphold the laws they are sworn to enforce.
135
A more carefully reasoned analysis of the problem is provided by Dean John Garvey and Professor Amy Coney Barrett 1 3 6 in a 1998 Marquette Law Review article entitled, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases. 137 They argue that Catholic judges who accept the teaching of the Church are morally precluded from enforcing the death penalty.
Determining whether this judgment of conscience will require the judge to recuse herself from participating in a capital case, however, will depend on the particular role that the judge plays in the proceedings. For example, a judge who accepts the Church's teaching should withdraw from any role that will require her to impose a sentence on a defendant in a death penalty case. Dean 134 See Scalia, supra note 34. 135 In Justice Scalia's view, the choice for the judge who believes the death penalty to be immoral is resignation rather than simply ignoring duly enacted constitutional laws and sabotaging the death penalty. He has, after all, taken an oath to apply those laws, and has been given no power to supplant them with rules of his own.
Id. Unlike Justice Scalia, U.S. Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz believes that the Church's teaching on the death penalty is correct. See Merz, supra note 28, at 311-13, 318. At the same time, however, Magistrate Judge Merz concludes that he and other Catholic judges can in good conscience preside over death penalty cases:
Because the prudential judgment about whether capital punishment remains necessary to defend innocent life is one about which reasonable, moral people can differ, whether we shall have it or not should be left to the mechanisms of democracy. Where the legislature has made a different judgment from the pope, a Catholic can still be a conscientious judge and participate in capital cases. Id. at 318. Magistrate Judge Merz does not, however, address the question of how a judge who himself or herself believes that the imposition of the death penalty is immoral and unjust can cooperate in the judicial proceedings leading to the imposition of the death penalty without doing damage to his or her own moral integrity. The cooperation analysis discussed in this Essay provides a set of analytical tools for addressing that important question.
136 Please note that Professor Amy Coney Barrett authored her article as Amy V. Coney.
137 Garvey & Coney, supra note 10.
Garvey and Professor Barrett argue that a judge who imposes a death sentence is engaged in formal cooperation with an unjust act.138 The judge who issues a sentencing order imposing the death penalty sets in motion a process in which the government is bound to execute the defendant unless there is an executive pardon. The judge who issues the sentencing order intends that this execution should take place. Accordingly, the judge here plays a role in an unjust act that amounts to formal cooperation, which is always prohibited.
139
In contrast, Garvey and Barrett argue that a judge could preside over the trial on the issue of guilt or innocence in a death penalty case, so long as the judge does not participate in the sentencing phase of the proceedings. 140 The judge here would be engaged only in material cooperation in the death sentence that may or may not be imposed on a defendant found guilty at trial. Would the judge have a proportionate reason that justifies such material cooperation? Garvey and Barrett argue that the judge would have a strong reason to preside over the trial on the issue of guilt. Society needs judges to enforce the criminal law; judges help maintain a peaceful and just society. It is this social good that should be weighed against the harm of material cooperation.
The evil of capital punishment is severe-it amounts to the unjust taking of a life. But the judge here does not actually participate in the sentencing, and does not know for sure that the death penalty will actually be imposed when the sentencing phase of the case takes place. Recusal would not prevent the evil, because the judge would simply be replaced by another judge. For these reasons, Garvey and Barrett conclude that the material cooperation in capital punishment provided by the judge's participation in the guilt phase of the case is morally justified. 141
The most difficult question of cooperation to analyze in the death penalty context might be faced by a judge reviewing a death sentence on direct appeal. 142 that an execution take place; affirming the sentence simply means that the trial court has followed the law in imposing the death penalty. The appellate judge, therefore, need not be characterized as intentionally directing or promoting the defendant's execution in a way that amounts to illicit formal cooperation in the execution. But, affirming the sentence would be an act of material cooperation that allows the execution to go forward. Is the material cooperation involved in affirming the death sentence justified by a proportionate reason? Garvey and Barrett are unsure whether the judge should reach that conclusion. Their uncertainty is rooted in their sense that most people would probably understand the act of affirming the death sentence as endorsement of the death sentence. 143 145 An appellate judge attentive to the potential for scandal involved in affirming a death sentence might, for example, effectively reduce the risk of scandal by writing an opinion that highlights the distinction between legal judgment and moral judgment and lets others know that "cooperation does not imply approval."' 146 A Supreme Court Justice like John Roberts, however, is not likely to be involved in this sort of direct appellate review of a particular capital sentence. The Supreme Court typically gets involved in the issue of the death penalty in a less direct way. The Supreme Court may be asked to decide whether the lower court proceedings afforded the defendant all the procedural rights required by the Constitution, or whether the capital sentencing law enacted by Congress or a state legislature is consistent with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The questions here boil down to whether or not other political actors have made decisions that are authorized by the Constitution. A Supreme Court justice might well conclude that the Eighth Amendment does not prevent Congress or a state legislature from enacting the death penalty.147 That conclusion of constitutional law is difficult to characterize as a moral endorsement of the legislature's independent choice to in fact authorize use of the death penalty. The judicial act of choosing not to undo the constitutionally authorized decision of another political actor is, therefore, a form of remote material cooperation that can be justified by the judge's duty to faithfully interpret the Constitution and respect the division of authority established by the Constitution.
148

CONCLUSION
The conclusions proposed for each of the cases discussed in this Essay may well be open to reasonable debate. One thing, however, should be clear: Careful attention to the role being played by the judge in a given case is essential to an adequate analysis of the cooperation issue. Contrary to Professor Turley's suggestion, it is highly unlikely that a Supreme Court Justice like John Roberts will find himself facing the sort of conflict between conscience and the Constitution that might require him to withdraw from participating in an abortion or death penalty case. Indeed, trial judges-who may be required by the law to issue orders authorizing a minor's abortion in a parental involvement bypass hearing or enforcing the death penalty in the sentencing phase of a capital case-are more likely to face a conflict between conscience and the law that might demand recusal in order to avoid culpable cooperation with evil.
In the end, the willingness of judges, legislators, and voters to wrestle with the question of cooperation is at least as important as the particular conclusions that any individual might reach in analyzing a particular case. Much of the debate about the role of Catholics in public life has failed to address this complex issue with the nuance and careful attention to role 147 Garvey & Coney, supra note 10, at 330. 148 See id. at 331.
distinctions that the long tradition of Catholic reflection on the principle of cooperation offers to us. 149 We should, therefore, attend to the question of cooperation with evil with conscientious care, because the principle of cooperation is not simply a matter of abstract theological speculation. At the heart of the analysis that has developed around the principle of cooperation is the question of what sort of people we will become through our actions in the world. 1 5 0 Those actions-including our actions in public life when we decide cases as judges and cast votes as legislators or as citizens-shape our characters, and thereby influence the kinds of people we will become. We could avoid some difficult questions by fleeing from participation in public life in an effort to insulate ourselves from any risk of ever cooperating in another person's wrongful action.152 But this would be a serious mistake. Bernard Haring puts the issue clearly in focus:
It might be very easy for one who has withdrawn from the world and who is concerned only with the salvation of his own soul to condemn with smug horror every species of material cooperation. But one who "in the world" wills to be active for the kingdom of God and the salvation of those who are in spiritual jeopardy will view the matter in quite a different light. He is faced with a serious problem. Any hyper-rigorous stance respecting material cooperation ... simply renders the exercise of the lay apostolate totally impossible. Anyone who sets up in his moral code the rigid principle forbidding any action which might be perverted by others must, to cite but one example, renounce politics entirely. He will be obliged to remain aloof from many significant areas of apostolic activity. 153 The gospel calls us to cooperate with God's love at work in the world through the ways in which we live our daily lives in the world. We respond to this call to cooperate with God's love in the midst of the concrete demands of our lives as judges, legislators, lawyers, and voters. 154 As we try to cooperate with God's Spirit at work in a human community that is also marked by ambiguity and sin, 155 we need to pay attention to these questions: Who are we becoming as people through the actions that form us as we strive to serve the common good in our varied public roles? Are we becoming ever more faithful to our mission as disciples to be light and salt for the world, 156 or does our cautious inaction in the face of the world's needs itself increase scandal? 15 7 My hope is
